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Anger Fast & Slow: 






We live, it has been said, in an ‘age of anger’ (Mishra, 2017). The rise of populism and 
cultural conflict in liberal democracies has been widely attributed to a heightened power of 
affect in public life, with resentment, hostility and rage playing a critical role in the 
mobilisation of support for the ‘hyper-leaders’ that drive nationalist parties (Davies, 2018; 
Gerbaudo, 2019). Where liberal government seeks to appeal to individual self-interest 
(primarily understood as enhanced economic welfare), populist politicians and parties 
address feelings of injustice and status anxiety, channelling a far wider range of moral 
emotions. Not unrelatedly, digital media platforms have established new spaces of cultural 
and political conflict, where trolling, hostility and scapegoating are common, and which are 
mediated by graphics as much as text (Phillips, 2015; Seymour, 2019).  
  
The important role of emotions within contemporary populism is becoming better 
understood (Demertzis, 2013; Salmela & von Scheve, 2017; Wahl-Jorgensen, 2018; Cossarini 
& Vallespín, 2019). In particular, anger has been recognised as a crucial emotion in the 
current political landscape, seeing as it has the capacity to mobilise people around a sense 
of injustice. It has long been recognised that anger is an ‘action’ emotion, that propels 
people in certain ways, whether for good or ill. It is also a reactive emotion, in that it is 
typically linked to some past injury or sleight that it seeks to redress or avenge. It has 
powerful political properties, if it can be released in a coordinated fashion (Lyman, 1981). 
Whether anger is focused on the appropriate target, or whether it is diverted towards some 
substitute, is another question altogether.  
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Yet when we speak of the political arena being disrupted by ‘anger’, this can summon up 
some quite heterogeneous types. Firstly, it often refers to feelings of resentment that have 
been building for years or even decades, lacking any adequate political release (Magni, 
2017). This is associated with a gradual disillusionment with mainstream politics, and a 
disengagement from democratic participation (Mair, 2013). The concept of ‘left behind’ 
people and spaces became something of a cliché in the aftermath of Britain’s referendum 
on EU membership and Donald Trump’s Presidential campaign victory. However, 
ethnographers have shown that feelings of anger amongst economically and culturally 
marginalised populations were indeed brewing for many years prior to 2016 (Hochschild, 
2016; Cramer, 2016). This is anger that is sedimented over a long period of time and held in 
reserve. It potentially forges whole political and moral identities.  
 
Secondly, there is the anger that is acted out in political argument, media debates and social 
media ‘wars’. The ‘anger’ that is attributed to Trump or to trolls is not one that derives from 
the past, at least not in the absence of any psychoanalytic excavation. Rather it is performed 
in real time, causing disruption via its speed and unpredictability. If anything it makes it 
more difficult to talk about the past (as a set of empirical experiences), seeing as it is 
constantly provoking more immediate reaction. Whether this anger is authentically felt, or 
whether it is a type of prank played on the rest of us, is impossible ever to fully establish. 
Nevertheless, it constantly generates new anger, before any previous grievances or past 
statements can be properly addressed. In the ‘attention economy’, angry behaviour is a 
tactic for drawing attention, while feelings of anger are frequently provoked by the 
misrepresentations, discriminations and oversights that inevitably occur in this frenetic 
media landscape.   
 
Lying between these two ideal types, we might also note a third type, that plays an 
important role in mediating economics and politics. Economic psychologists have noted that 
we are affected by losses of status and income, far more than we are by gains (Payne, 
2017). Put in the context of capitalist development, this means that we can experience 
years of gradual improvements in welfare, without any commensurate increase in life 
satisfaction, but experience acute pain and indignation in the immediate aftermath of any 
losses (as in a recession). It is telling that support for populist parties in Europe correlates 
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more closely to the rate at which unemployment has increased than to aggregate 
unemployment (Algan et al, 2017). Similarly, the crucial Mid-Western counties that swung 
from Obama to Trump in 2016 had all experienced a plant closure during the 2016 
presidential campaign season itself (Davis, 2017). Populist support is more closely 
associated with feelings of relative deprivation (failing to keep up with others) than with 
objective deprivation (Pettigrew et al, 2017). Sudden localised downturns of economic 
prosperity and status might produce a particularly acute form of anger in the medium term, 
which can convert more easily into political mobilisation.  
 
One way of distinguishing these three different species of anger is via the different 
chronologies involved. The first is anger that accumulates over the long-term, married to 
entrenched feelings of injustice and resentment that don’t find adequate political 
expression in the near-term. The second is anger as a form of rhetorical and somatic 
performance and combat, that exists in real-time, with immediate affective prompts and 
consequences. The third is an anger that reflects recent changes in the distribution of status 
and welfare in society. These are all variants of anger, but they offer different ways of 
relating past and present. Where anger is ‘pent-up’, it sees the past exerting an over-bearing 
influence upon the present; where it is sheer performance, it obliterates memory or 
empirics, focusing all attention upon the present. Undoubtedly, each of these has political 
implications, and may often be assembled in certain ways to achieve political ends. 
Successful demagogic leaders will often have the ability to channel all of them, synthesising 
long-term resentments, current fears and insecurities, and the spectacle of a live event, to 
produce a moment of mass affective expression. Without some kind of political resolution – 
justice – the pain of the past continues to haunt the present, but the effect of relentless 
‘real-time’ anger is to make such resolution impossible to carry out. This is a common 
dynamic effect of populist leadership, which speaks to anger, cultivates it, but never 
resolves it.  
 
One response to demagoguery is to say that anger – or even emotion in general - has no 
place in politics, and must be eliminated. This is both empirically and politically naïve. As 
numerous feminist scholars have argued, anger has positive political attributes (e.g. Lorde, 
1981). But how do we distinguish ‘good’ anger from that of the demagogue? How might we 
 4 
resist the tendency to lump all anger together, as if everything – Twitter, Trump, #Metoo, 
Fox News, Brexit – were all just symptoms of a diffuse atmosphere of blame and hostility? 
One way is to consider that spaces and times need to be defended, in which anger about 
the past can be articulated, without being either ignored (such that it is sustained for even 
longer) or expressed via a kind of real-time rage that exists solely in the present.    
 
In this article, I propose disaggregating anger by considering its different chronologies and 
speeds, and exploring the different political attributes of each. The aim is not to specify 
what normatively ‘good’ anger consists of, which would be to deny the spontaneous and 
extra-normative dimensions of anger, let alone to prescribe how or when we should be 
angry. But the rise of populism has generated some simplistic and confused accounts of 
anger, that fail to recognise its varieties, its benefits and its harms. My hope is that this 
paper will shed some sociological light on the contemporary political moment by 
highlighting the divergent ways in which anger can mediate political temporality. It is 
structured as follows. In the next section, I outline some of the key properties of anger, 
reviewing recent arguments within political philosophy and affect theory regarding the 
status (and benefits) of anger. Anger, I argue, has properties in common with both justice 
and violence, and can pull towards either pole depending on the pace at which it is 
exercised. I then turn to different ‘speeds’ of anger in turn, starting with the ‘slow’ anger 
that accumulates over time, then turning to the ‘fast’ anger that briefly seems to abolish the 
past altogether. In conclusion, I offer some reflections on what moderation might look like, 
not in the sense of less anger, but in the sense of a thoughtful, purposive anger, which is 
neither nostalgic nor explosive.  
 
 
What is anger? 
 
Arguably the most famous definition of anger belongs to Aristotle: “an impulse, 
accompanied by pain, to a conspicuous revenge for a conspicuous slight directed without 
justification towards what concerns oneself or towards what concerns one’s friends” 
(Aristotle, 1968: 1382-83). This definition does not perfectly capture every possible case of 
(what we describe as) ‘anger’. In particular, it assumes that anger is necessarily felt towards 
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those who are responsible for some ‘slight’, whereas it is eminently possible to feel and 
direct anger towards a blameless substitute, such as traffic or some inanimate object (Miceli 
& Castelfranchi, 2019). However, Aristotle’s definition does draw our attention to a number 
of key elements of anger, that have been fought over by conflicting traditions of psychology 
and philosophy. These conflicts are themselves revealing of some of the ambivalences of 
anger, which hovers between conscious and unconscious action, subjective judgement and 
physical response, visions of justice and the urge to violence.    
 
Firstly, Aristotle highlights the somatic and affective nature of anger (the ‘impulse’ and the 
‘pain’). Anger is something that is embodied to some extent, and which is likely to translate 
into some kind of action. For positivist sciences of emotion, this embodied dimension 
represents the full extent of anger, showing itself in facial and other behaviours, as one of a 
fixed number of ‘basic emotions’ (Leys, 2017). Angry feelings and behaviour can be studied 
as objects independently of what explains them or what they intend towards. William James 
(1884: 190), in his famous somatic theory of emotion, writes we feel “angry because we 
strike”. Anger is something that comes over us as a distinctive state of physiological and 
behavioural being. 
 
By itself, the physical and affective state of anger doesn’t tell us anything about the world. 
Reduced wholly to various symptoms (such as facial expression and heart-rate), anger exists 
wholly independently of the type of ‘slight’ Aristotle speaks of, or any other type of injustice 
or harm committed in the past. This allows us to speak of ‘angry behaviour’ as a form of 
spontaneous violence, that is wholly disruptive, rather than representative of anything. This 
strips anger of any evaluative or cognitive capacity. Instead, it opens up philosophical, 
neurological and evolutionary questions about the autonomic nature of our reactions and 
their physical correlates (Massumi, 1995). But these are assumed to exist independently of 
conscious and discursive accounts of why we are angry, or what we are angry about.  
 
However, Aristotle’s definition draws our attention to a second quality of anger, that pulls 
against this tendency. Anger is typically accompanied by a sense of indignation, that 
something in the past has produced a wrong that needs to be repaid in some way. It 
includes a desire for retribution, to create some kind of balance between pain suffered and 
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pain re-paid. This points to the intentional dimension of anger, which is foregrounded in 
philosophies which view emotions as ways of acting meaningfully and judgementally 
towards a goal in the world (Solomon, 2004; Sartre, 2015 [1939]). The risk, of course, is that 
angry exchanges can continue indefinitely and escalate, if they are not accompanied by a 
resolution mechanism, in the form of justice and proportionality. It’s for this reason that 
Martha Nussbaum believes societies need transition mechanisms, that move them from 
moral economies of anger (based around desire to repay harm) to those of justice, where a 
key property of the latter is precisely that it allows us to leave pain and anger behind 
(Nussbaum, 2016).  
 
Nussbaum’s argument is that, if we are serious about achieving some kind of balance for 
past wrongs and harms, then anger is not a reasonable means of achieving this. Repaying a 
wrong does not, in fact, improve the situation of the wronged party. Only if anger is born 
out of jealousy (and I want to stop you enjoying what you have) does it achieve what it sets 
out to. Law, on the other hand, provides us with the physical protection we need from 
harm, without requiring us to inflict suffering upon wrong-doers ourselves (Nussbaum, 
2016: 4). The question of balancing out harms needs, therefore, to be divorced from the 
somatic and impulsive dimensions of anger, which belong to our physiological make-up 
where “it derives very likely, from its evolutionary role as a "fight-or-flight" mechanism” 
(Nussbaum, 2016: 39). For Nussbaum, anger is – at best – a type of stunted judicial 
mechanism, and at worse it is brute violence.  
 
Yet, Nussbaum’s negative evaluation of anger rests heavily on a teleological argument, of 
whether it achieves the outcomes that it purports to seek. Anger does not successfully 
‘settle up’ (other than where it is wholly focused on status imbalances), she argues, whereas 
law does. Against this, Srinivasan has argued that anger can be normatively justified, even 
when it produces a worse outcome, if it is nevertheless an appropriate response to injustice 
and oppression (Srinivasan, 2018). We can be justified in our anger, even when our anger 
makes the situation (including our own) worse. Srinivasan’s argument echoes a long line of 
feminist political critique, which treats anger as a potentially positive force in bringing 
oppression to light and resisting it (Lorde, 1981; Holmes, 2004). Recognised as a “power 
emotion” and an “action emotion”, it becomes an indispensable part of political 
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engagement and mobilisation, of a sort that will not simply wait for legal and 
representational means of moral redress (Schieman, 2006; Demertzis, 2019). There is no 
guarantee that anger will improve the state of the world, but it can nevertheless perform a 
type of embodied judgement and disruption of oppressive structures.  
 
Anger therefore brings questions of justice into orbit with those of affect, embodiment and 
violence. As  Jean-Paul Sartre’s account of emotion, it sees conscious intentions (which have 
objects in the world) enter a kind of ‘magical’ alliance with unconscious bodily movements 
(Sartre, 2015: 47). In its optimal form, anger manages to marry justified indignation to 
bodily action in the world, potentially including violence. But of course, this optimal state 
may be the exception rather than the rule. It may be that we feel angry for a set of good 
reasons that we can articulate but not act upon, and that we behave angrily elsewhere for 
no apparent reason at all. For various reasons, the moral quality of anger and the physical 
response of anger can become detached, and angry behaviour then appears irrational and 
violent, like a causa sui. ‘Good’ anger is not allergic to violence, but it is at least in touch 
with moral reasons and memories of past harms. As Hannah Arendt (1970: 64) wrote, “rage 
and violence turn irrational only when they are directed against substitutes”. 
 
Part of the problem of anger, as a political phenomenon, is that its value depends on being 
in the right place at the right time. This is impossible to guarantee, indeed anger that was 
entirely measured and deliberate would cease to be anger, and become something else (as 
Nussbaum hopes). There is an intrinsic risk in angry responses, that they might be excessive 
or harmful to an innocent party, or to the angry person themselves. Angry responses are 
necessarily extra-juridical and in some sense self-legislating. But there is a converse risk, 
namely that anger gets ‘bottled up’ until no type of release or action is possible, and 
injustice comes to seem permanent.  
 
This points to the chronological dimension of anger that concerns us in this paper, namely 
that anger varies in the time that elapses before a reaction occurs. Frederick Douglass noted 
that if the expression of rage can be delayed somewhat (though not supressed or averted), 
it allows for an “investigation of whatever has caused it” (Sokoloff 2014). The extent to 
which anger successfully balances and fuses claims to justice with embodied action is a 
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question of the speed at which the exchange of recognition and harms takes place. The 
psychologist Daniel Kahneman has famously distinguished ‘thinking fast’ from ‘thinking 
slow’, where the former “operates automatically and quickly, with little or no effort and no 
sense of voluntary control”, while the latter “allocates attention to the effortful mental 
activities that demand it [and is] often associated with the subjective experience of agency, 
choice and concentration” (Kahneman, 2012: 22). Perhaps, therefore, we can speak also of 
‘anger fast and slow’, which points to the two potential poles of anger. The former pulls 
towards an automatic physical response, which cries or lashes out before thought has had 
time to intrude or establish any kind of delay. This is anger as physiological affective 
reaction, of the sort that James describes in ‘What is An Emotion?’, and which Nussbaum 
appears to have in mind when she speculates that anger has an ‘evolutionary’ function. The 
latter pulls towards restorative justice, but grants excessive power to memory and mental 
self-restraint, such that anger is never released. Neither of these is normatively 
objectionable in and of itself, save for where they become over-bearing and break away 
from the other pole. A wholly automatic anger is impervious to reasons, while anger that 
exists solely in the conscious mind becomes melancholic. Borrowing Kahneman’s terms in 
this way potentially illuminates how anger can and does go wrong: when it becomes too fast 
and violent on the one hand, and too slow and restrained on the other. The anger currently 





The institutions of law, finance and the market are interlocking ways of establishing a sense 
of balance in society, that is, of sustaining the belief that scores have been settled. All of 
them assume that, with the aid of recording mechanisms (such as witness statements and 
book-keeping), past, present and future will be woven together in a system of 
accountability, which levels everything out. It was Nietzsche’s (2013 [1887]) great insight 
that ideals of market exchange and of moral exchange share a common origin, in the notion 
of an indebted subject who would be compelled to pay what they owe, either back to 
society (in the form of a punishment) or to a creditor (in the form of a repayment).. 
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There is something utopian in the idea that all forms of pain, loss and suffering can be 
successfully captured via formal systems of accountability and repayment. Nietzsche viewed 
Christian morality as the most all-encompassing effort to achieve this, encouraging 
individuals to believe that all forms of suffering were being recorded in a metaphysical 
balance sheet, to be repaid and settled in the next life. “What really raises one’s indignation 
against suffering is not suffering itself, but the senselessness of it all”, he wrote (2013: 54). 
By making sense of all suffering, Christianity sought to eradicate indignation, and thereby 
worldly action. Today, we can point to the surveillance and calculation technologies that 
subject all of our actions to a constant moral evaluation, on behalf of potential creditors 
(Lazzarato, 2013). The equally utopian ideal of the ‘spot market’ implies a type of synchronic 
exchange, in which all forms of mutual obligation are created and then settled in a single 
instant, without any form of continuing relationship or ‘externality’. These devices purport 
to place pain in a moral-economic grid of calculation and just desert. 
  
Being always extra-juridical in nature (that is, leaking outside of formal norms and codes) 
anger points to the inadequacy of such efforts to create an adequate ledger of human 
suffering over time. In that respect, anger is a vital mode of meta-critique of systems of 
evaluation and accountability which are themselves critical in nature (Boltanski & Thevenot, 
2006; Boltanski, 2011). Precisely because it emanates from the body as much as from 
reason, anger is potentially a means of subjecting regimes of denunciation and blame to 
renunciation and blame. Sloterdijk identifies this moment of extra-juridical judgement: 
 
When the public order is accused of malfunctioning or of being a part of the problem 
(we might think of preferential treatment in court proceedings), individuals can take 
themselves to represent justice as wild judges. 
(Sloterdijk, 2012: 65) 
 
The difficulty, as Nietzsche and Freud both emphasised, is that dominant systems of 
accounting, accountability, justice and moral responsibility are all predicated on seeking to 
channel, rationalise and constrain the expression of injustice and blame. In the process, 
anger becomes trapped, and turns into something that lacks active embodied expression. 
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For Nietzsche, Christian morality was founded precisely on a renunciation of violent 
retribution against those it despised, therefore producing a psychology of ressentiment, 
which repressed the anger and thereby made it impossible to release. Freud’s notion of 
‘melancholia’ rests on a similar understanding, namely that individuals incapable of 
recognising the external source of their suffering (which for Freud was a loss of a loved 
person or object) would cling on to the suffering instead, and attribute its cause to 
themselves (Freud, 2005). In both cases, a failure to engage intentionally and meaningfully 
with the source of suffering (external to oneself) creates a turn inwards, towards repetitive  
self-punishment and a refusal to let go of the pain. Pathologies of ressentiment and 
melancholia are exactly why attempts to eradicate anger, or to rationalise it via mechanisms 
of law and economics, may ultimately produce a far worse problem that is sustained well 
beyond the time horizons of the original injury. One lesson of Nietzsche and Freud is that no 
formal normative system of exchange and accountability is fully adequate to capture and 
make sense of suffering, and there must be space for a form of self-legislating, angry 
denunciation, or else this will get repressed and do even greater harm over time. 
 
Scholars of political emotions have argued that ressentiment needs to be distinguished from 
ordinary resentment, if we are to understand different types of political mobilisation, 
especially in the age of populism (Salmela & von Scheve, 2017; Demertzis, 2019). 
Ressentiment is a type of blockage, an excess of conscience, which gets in the way of 
political action or expression. Resentment, on the other hand, can be seen as an entirely 
practical, indeed necessary, political emotion that responds to a perceived wrong of some 
kind. Resentment is arguably an integral feature of democracy and egalitarianism, inasmuch 
as it targets the hoarding of privilege and power as bad in and of itself, and not only on 
utilitarian grounds (Engels, 2015). Ressentiment, by contrast, (like melancholia) turns away 
from the world of action and denunciation, and towards a feeling of isolated helplessness 
and shame. Lacking an external object to blame and punish, punishment turns inwards.  
 
There are good reasons to suspect that neoliberal ideology and rationality is especially 
prone to generate these affective states. Neoliberalism seeks to re-activate subjectivity, but 
in the particular form of a morally endowed, responsible debtor, who is accountable for the 
full costs and benefits of all their choices, risks and decisions, both inside and outside of the 
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market (Rose, 1996; Lazzarato, 2012; Cooper, 2017; Feher, 2018). Economic rationality 
becomes all-engulfing, emptying society of non-calculable forms of voice and critique 
(Foucault, 2008; Brown, 2014; Davies, 2014). This is a heavily moralised vision of individual 
agency, which combines with extensive infrastructures of surveillance and evaluation, to 
ensure that suffering always returns to the individual who has earned it by virtue of their 
character, effort or lack of foresight. Eventually, neoliberalism becomes a moral framework 
for the allocation of punishment, regardless of utility (Davies, 2016).   
 
What is potentially psychologically devastating about neoliberalism is the relentlessness of 
evaluation that it perpetuates. Liberal governmentality historically witnesses multiple 
spheres of worth, resting on incommensurable instruments of evaluation (such as ‘social’, 
‘economic’ and ‘political’) (Boltanski & Thevenot, 2006), operating in tandem with 
instruments of normative ‘discipline’ that are restricted to specific times and spaces 
(Foucault, 1991). But neoliberalism is characterised by ‘economic imperialism’, in which all 
behaviour is judged according to a single measure of monetary cost and benefit, and non-
market activity is judged according to its potential impact on market values (Fine, 2002; 
Foucault, 2008). Combined with pervasive technologies of control, such as those of social 
media platforms, and there becomes one all-encompassing measure of worth, without any 
‘outside’. Responsibility, especially for debt and past mistakes, becomes overbearing and 
inescapable, raising the likelihood of some kind of depressive collapse.    
 
In this context, populism serves as a potentially healthy re-activation of political subjectivity 
and of anger, but only because such things have lain dormant for so long. Magni’s empirical 
analysis of populist voters finds that they express high levels of anger, combined with low 
levels of political ‘efficacy’: they are indignant about injustice, but have very low confidence 
that the mechanisms of liberal democracy are adequate to represent or respond to this 
injustice (Magni, 2017). The anger exists, but not in the form of any action or expression. It 
is what Hochschild refers to as the “deep story” of perceived endemic injustice, that is 
experienced but never publicly represented (Hochschild, 2016). Whether or not the populist 
leader is morally credible in their promise to deliver justice and compensate for past 
suffering, they are at least willing to denounce the established system (of markets, finance 
and law) which presently promises to settle things up. Such leaders do not require trust in 
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order to acquire support; they simply need to call out the existing system through which 
responsibility and suffering is presently distributed (Hahl, et al, 2018).  
 
The tipping point between liberal hegemony and populist ascendency is very often some 
form of establishment corruption, which conveys the sense that norms of punishment and 
repayment do not apply to those who oversee them. Populism is typically defined as a 
rhetoric that opposes a morally pure ‘people’ against a corrupt ‘elite’ (Mudde & Kaltwasser, 
2017; Mueller, 2017). The ‘elite’ is exposed as having ‘rigged the system’ in its own favour, 
suggesting that dominant moral-economic codes are a sham. The financial crisis was an epic 
example of this, inasmuch as the handlers of risk and credit were exempted from the 
austere debtor morality that their instruments applied to everyone else. This seems to be a 
powerful trigger for activating anger. As Arendt observed, “if we inquire historically into the 
causes likely to transform engagés into enragés, it is not injustice that ranks first, but 
hypocrisy” (Arendt, 1970: 65). What it implies is that the enforcers of responsibility are 
permitted to behave irresponsibly, which simultaneously de-legitimises formal mechanisms 
for allocating blame and suffering, and legitimates the informal one of anger.  
 
The populist leader seizes such opportunities to convert ressentiment (inner-directed rage) 
into resentment (outer-directed rage). The passage of time that precedes this reversal 
slowly adds to the accumulation of anger, in ways that escape formal and public efforts to 
account for suffering. Sloterdijk refers to the formation of “rage potential” and “rage 
banks”, that build up thanks to the patient deferral of any political action (Sloterdijk, 2012: 
60-62). The indebted, depressed subject, who lacks belief in their own efficacy in the world, 
is manifestly not enraged or even angry. However, we might nevertheless view the 
sustained suppression of resentment and political anger as a series of deposits in a ‘bank’, 
which can later be seized in the form of violent political expression. Reflecting on her five-
year ethnography, that concluded in 2016, Hochschild writes “looking back at my previous 
research, I see that the scene had been set for Trump’s rise, like kindling before a match is 







‘Slow anger’ builds up over time, accumulating thanks to the power of human memory, and 
the felt injustices of the juridical and economic mechanisms which purport to settle scores. 
It is deposited as a type of ‘externality’, every time a bureaucratic, legal or financial penalty 
is set, which (inevitably) fails to fully account for the contingencies and complexities of the 
case. It is remembered and thought about to excess, becoming pathological in the form of 
melancholia and ressentiment. ‘Fast anger’ suffers from the opposite problem. There is a 
complete circumvention of thought or memory, and a kind of ecstatic revelling in the 
present, as if past and future do not exist. The somatic and violent dimensions of anger 
become everything, and there is a brief liberation from conscious intentions, honesty or 
reasons. If ‘slow anger’ is a thwarted desire for moral retribution, emanating from the 
conscious mind and memory, then ‘fast anger’ is closer to an autonomic and physiological 
action or reaction, that is prior to conscious thought.  
 
When it reaches its violent extreme, anger loses its indignant quality (which is what makes it 
a political emotion) and becomes a kind of indecipherable rage. But in the process, there is a 
loss of subjectivity or intentionality about the anger, which poses questions about its 
authenticity as anger. Rather as affect theorists and scientists of facial expression would 
assume, anger becomes purely behavioural and performative – a set of recognisable body 
movements, which do not possess any signification. It illuminates nothing about the world 
or subjective intention. This loss of interiority is described by Sloterdijk as follows: 
 
In the case of pure rage there is no complex inner life, no hidden psychic world, no 
private secret through which the hero would become understandable to other 
human beings. Rather, the basic principle is that the inner life of the actor should 
become wholly manifest and wholly public. 
(Sloterdijk, 2012: 9) 
 
This type of violent emotion is a limiting case for what can be described as ‘anger’, seeing as 
any sense of injustice, past harm or retribution has evaporated, and the body becomes 
autonomous.   
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Anger may not escalate to this level of meaningless rage, but may nevertheless come too 
quickly and too easily, to the point where it fails to find objects to attach itself to. Instead, it 
is spewed out in various directions, to an extent that raises doubts as to whether it is 
meaningful or serious. Melanie Klein’s theory of the paranoid-schizoid position refers to the 
tendency to ‘split’ all negative aspects of the self, and project them outwards onto the 
world, such that everything is deemed bad and oppressive, and the self is beyond reproach. 
But such a self is very hard to meaningfully engage with at all. Klein describes encountering 
patients in the paranoid-schizoid position, full of anger and resentment, but lacking any real 
concern with what it was focused on. In one case she writes of a man for whom: 
 
very strong feelings of frustration, envy and grievance came to the fore. When I 
interpreted… that these feelings were directed against the analyst and that he 
wanted to destroy me, his mood changed abruptly. The tone of his voice became 
flat, he spoke in a slow expressionless way, and he said that he felt detached from 
the whole situation. He added that my interpretation seemed correct, but it did not 
matter. In fact, he no longer had any wishes, and nothing was worth bothering with. 
(Klein, 1946: 19) 
 
Part of his ego had temporarily “gone out of existence”, leaving him in a state of “detached 
hostility” (Klein, 1946). Anger becomes a way of living entirely in the present, as a way of 
avoiding any reflection or engagement with the past, or one’s own inner psychic life. But for 
the same reason, it is empty of any signification. 
 
This type of hostility banishes memory and, with it, empirical evidence of wrongdoing and 
harm in the past. It is sheer unaccountability, in the sense that it refuses to take stock of 
what has happened or to gauge its fairness. Instead, it revels in unfairness and an absence 
of any measure. Nothing captures this as well as the figure of Donald Trump, whose ecstatic 
performances exist in a constant state of ‘real-time’, and are never inhibited by past 
statements or facts. Trump’s refusal to be bound by the record (including records of his own 
words) makes him the perfect vehicle for an affective politics that seeks to eradicate the 
past as a set of verifiable empirical experiences. Just as Klein describes, Trump’s 
 15 
performances are a form of “detached hostility”, which veer between the irate and the 
‘flat’, making it impossible to tell if he’s really angry, or what he’s angry about.  
 
Anger of this nature adds to the amount of violence and pain in the world, initiating new 
transactions of harm. The enraged person becomes what Sloterdijk calls a “pain donor”, 
distributing pain to others who currently lack it. Survey evidence on attitudes of nationalist 
voters indicates a commitment to ‘authoritarian values’, which translate into greater use of 
violence across society, in relation to criminals, terror suspects and children (Norris & 
Inglehart, 2019). Use of torture is viewed positively. While we can speculate about how 
childhood experiences might forge such attitudes, there is no sense in which these 
preferences relate to any perceived injustice. Instead, there is simply a view that levels of 
violence in society are too low, and inhibited by liberal norms and laws. The assumption is 
not that pain needs re-paying, as in a liberal or neoliberal moral economy, just that there 
should be more of it. 
 
For multiple reasons, the internet seems ideally suited to the cultivation of “detached 
hostility”, of a sort that is perpetually acted out, but never fully interrogated or explained. 
First of all, the massive over-abundance of information to which we are subjected in the 
digital age requires us to adopt ‘post-comprehensive’ techniques of navigation and 
selection, which side-line semiotic problems of critique, interpretation and representation, 
in favour of techniques for the grabbing of attention and physiological responses (Andrejvic, 
2013). We are constantly subject to techniques of emotional manipulation, which are 
founded in theories that treat emotion as wholly physiological and behavioural (Davies, 
2015; McStay, 2018). Meanwhile, we (wittingly or otherwise) subject others to emotional 
manipulation in the way we communicate online: it has been shown that tweets with a high 
level of ‘moral emotion’ travel more virally than those without (Brady et al, 2017). Thus, 
online interaction becomes a constant cybernetic cycle of stimulus and response, but 
without pauses in which thought might interrupt autonomic responses. The emotion that is 
triggered and monitored online is conceived as wholly real-time, a data point in an 
unceasing flow of behaviour, rather than a judgement or intention that relates to the past 
(Davies, 2017). 
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Twitter exchanges are a case in point. First of all, every Twitter user can feel resentful that 
they do not get as much attention as those with more followers than them, of which there 
will always be some (hence journalists receive particular hostility in this domain). Unlike the 
marketplace or legal system, Twitter has no mechanism for establishing that a distribution 
of value (in this case, attention) is ‘fair’ and finished. Attention can be gained either through 
a spontaneous attack on others (trolling) or through some impassioned denunciation of a 
deep injustice, that is going unrecognised by ‘mainstream’ institutions. Often the two are 
combined as a type of ‘call-out’: an alleged moral bad is shared online, to prompt 
resentment (and potentially a ‘pile-on’) against the target. However, attention is never the 
same thing as recognition, and no matter how much attention might be gained, there is 
never the satisfaction of being properly understood or heard. Indeed, the more attention 
there is, the greater the chance of being mis-represented and mis-recognised in the scrum. 
In this context, misunderstanding and selective quotation are not deviations from the 
communicative norm, but central to the forms of exchange that take place. The pursuit of 
attention is fundamentally at odds with the pursuit of mutual understanding (Smith, 2019; 
Seymour, 2019). Twitter is a machine for increasing the over-all levels of anger in the world.  
 
The problem with this kind of case is its presentism. Where social life is reduced to a 
cybernetic interplay of attention (the behaviour of brains and eyes) and affective behaviour 
(emojis, facial movements, expressions of outrage) there is an eradication of self and of 
memory, meaning that claims of injustice and harm are reduced to their mere appearance. 
When Christine Blasey Ford testified to the US Senate in 2018, that then Supreme Court 
nominee Brett Kavanaugh had sexually assaulted her in 1982, including acute memories and 
empirical details of the effect it had had on her, Kavanaugh’s response was a demonstration 
of how ‘slow anger’ can be smothered with ‘fast anger’. He became visibly and physically 
enraged, wept, lashed out at the Clintons, claimed persecution and declared that he “feared 
for the future”. Reports of the past were rebuffed with pure affective performance in the 
present. Affect is how the present is first encountered (Berlant, 2011), but for the same 
reason affective interventions and manipulations can make the present over-bearing, and 
quash other forms of cognition.   
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Speed of reactivity is an essential feature of this mode of anger, as it closes down the 
possibility of a purposeful and empirically-based anger, that takes time to be expressed and 
heard. Speed and hostility produce a self-reinforcing cycle, which is the essential property of 
the Hobbesian ‘state of nature’. The danger of lawlessness for Hobbes was that it becomes 
rational to attack others before they attack you: rapid response is everything when it comes 
to self-defence. The origins of digital computing lie precisely in the need to accelerate 
calculation and anticipation to super-human speeds, in the paranoid context of aerial 
warfare and nuclear threats (Galison, 1994; Edwards, 1997). Violent conflict has a tendency 
to accelerate social exchange, and an acceleration of social exchange comes to feel more 
like conflict (Virilio, 2006). The ‘real-time’ nature of the 24/7 media cycle, which removes 
moments of interruption for critical reflection and recuperation, arguably renders public 
dialogue closer to a form of combat, in which respondents must rely increasingly on instinct, 
first impressions and the power of surprise, as is the case in war (Crary, 2013; Author’s own, 
2018). There is no ‘down time’. The ‘flame wars’ and ‘culture wars’ of social media escalate 
partly because they lack interruption.  
 
The anger of Trump, Kavanaugh and Twitter trolls is of a nature that lacks interiority, and 
belongs rather to a type of cyborg that has learnt ‘anger’ as a code. Sartre writes that “if 
emotion is play-acting, the play is one that we believe in”, however the ‘detached hostility’ 
of anger performances struggles to suspend our disbelief (Sartre, 2015: 41). Anger becomes 
sheer performance, what Lazzarato terms a “power sign”, that executes a change, rather 
than refers to something (Lazzarato, 2014: 86). What this can certainly do, however, is to 
damage the possibility of mutual semiotic comprehension, because it has the advantage of 
moving at speed. If mutual recognition is necessarily slow (potentially, in the case of psycho-
analysis, very slow indeed), then diversion through fury and hostility is extremely fast. It 
renders shared reality and a shared past impossible to attain, since it does violence to the 
basic semiotic tools through which human beings can understand one another and 
recognise others’ experiences as real and meaningful. Misunderstanding and mis-




Fast anger operates without any consciousness of time, but nevertheless leaves a residue 
over time. Rather than the type of ‘rage bank’ described by Sloterdijk (namely a build-up of 
internal resentment, that can eventually be converted into political action by the right 
leader), the staged cybernetic anger of trolls and demagogues produces a slowly more 
conflicted and violent world. Being wholly expressive and embodied, this is an anger that 
lacks any normative or interpretive capacity, but has the effect of reducing the political 
possibilities of normative and interpretive discourse. As Arendt (1970: 80) argued, “the 
practice of violence, like all action, changes the world, but the most probable change is a 
more violent world”. For the vast majority of us, who lack the power of the angry celebrity, 
we deposit our staged anger in the ‘banks’ owned by Silicon Valley, where it provides data 
for the proprietors and their algorithms to learn more about patterns of sentiment and 
affective behaviour. In the terms of Mark Hansen, this anger should not be understood as 
‘feedback’ on past experiences, so much as ‘feed-forward’ of behavioural responses to be 




Conclusion: time for anger 
 
The analysis presented in this paper seeks to shed light on the ambivalences of anger, as a 
way to understand the ambivalent promises and dangers of populism. Anger is political and 
emancipatory to the extent that it fuses well-grounded feelings of injustice and indignation 
with an embodied capacity and tendency to act and denounce. It brings the thinking mind 
and the acting body into a type of alliance and rhythm, just as walking and public assembly 
can do. It also frees politics from the limits of established normativity and established 
modes of denunciation, bringing both risks and new possibilities. It is possible to imagine a 
form of populism that seized precisely this mode of anger, speaking simultaneously to the 
truth of past suffering, and to the impulse to respond and disrupt. Judis (2016) notes that 
populism can be either ‘diadic’ or ‘triadic’. ‘Diadic’ populism pits ‘the people’ against the 
‘elites’ who hold power and privilege, and is typically associated with the Left. This 
harnessing of anti-elite resentment is in some ways the essence of democracy (D’Eramo, 
2013; Engels, 2015; Mouffe, 2018).  
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‘Triadic’ populism, associated more with the nationalist right, adds a third party to the moral 
economy of anger, in the form of the immigrant, refugee, the European Union, Jew or 
‘welfare scrounger’. The message of the nationalist is that ‘the people’ have been betrayed 
by ‘the elites’, who are guilty of prioritising the third party over the real people. Anger and 
blame therefore descends on both the elite, and this foreign minority that has infiltrated 
society. The power of the demagogic leader is to take ressentiment that has accumulated 
over the long-term, exploit the economic downturn of medium-term, and then unleash 
anger upon the ‘elites’ and the third party, where the latter may have played no 
demonstrable role in the harms and wrongs of the past. An excess of memory and moral 
culpability in the population (manifest as shame) is married to a complete vacuum of 
interiority on the part of the leader and affective media performances, such that pain can be 
harnessed and directed against entirely blameless others.  
 
In the terms I’m using here, ‘triadic’ populism seizes the opportunities presented by the 
bifurcation of ‘slow’ and ‘fast’ anger. The accumulation of unexpressed, melancholic anger 
goes unrecognised, until it is suddenly lanced by the injection of a type of attention-
grabbing violence, that offers it a cathartic release. This is the collision of two different ideas 
of agency, which are very unalike, but have both been cultivated under neoliberalism. The 
first is that of the moralised, responsible self, who can only blame themselves for whatever 
harms they encounter over time. This is the debtor self, who must constantly demonstrate 
good character in the eyes of credit scorers, workfare contractors and auditors. This aspect 
of neoliberalism constantly leaks unaccounted-for resentment, every time an individual is 
blamed for something that is beyond their control. The second vision of agency is of an 
asemiotic cyborg self, who is reducible to the performance of neural and technical codes. 
Such a self is not endowed with moral conscience, but is increasingly being mobilised by 
infrastructures of real-time stimulus and surveillance, which constitute the platform 
economy. As the history of the philosophy and science of emotions testifies, anger means 




Both are symptoms and causes of prolonged depoliticization and withdrawal from 
democratic participation, as seen across liberal democracies from the 1980s onwards 
(Crouch, 2004; Mair, 2013; Streeck, 2016). Psychologically and psycho-analytically, 
democracy offers what neither law nor economics can, which is to publicly represent forms 
of suffering and harm that do not breach formal rules. It ensures that, even while rules of 
exchange are in place and upheld, that anger can nevertheless be voiced, heard and 
understood, to the effect that the system does not capture human pain in its entirety. The 
depressed self (which turns anger inwards) and the cyborg self (that performs anger as 
meaningless behaviour) are twin responses to a politics that has radically downgraded the 
power of intentions and voice. Resentment towards those who seem to still possess public 
voice and be listened to, such as commentators, experts and cultural elites, grows 
commensurately with the decline of mass participation in democracy.  
 
The question this leaves us with is how we can make the right kind of time for anger, which 
might also be the basis of a ‘diadic’ populism which names the source of suffering in a more 
reasoned and empirically-grounded fashion. This might require us to produce new ways of 
writing, publishing and narrating (or re-purpose old ones), that can represent experience of 
harm with enough time-lag for it to be thought about and understood, but not so much 
time-lag that memory has got polluted by melancholia, ressentiment and misleading 
nostalgia. New ‘utopias of writing’ need imagining (Seymour, 2019). Nixon poses the 
question in relation to ecological and colonial devastation: 
 
How do we bring home - and bring emotionally to life - threats that take time to 
wreak their havoc, threats that never materialize in one spectacular, explosive, 
cinematic scene? Apprehension is a critical word here, a crossover term that draws 
together the domains of perception, emotion, and action. To engage slow violence is 
to confront layered predicaments of apprehension: to apprehend - to arrest, or at 
least mitigate - often imperceptible threat requires rendering them apprehensible to 
the senses through the work of scientific and imaginative testimony. 
(Nixon, 2011: 14) 
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For Nixon, this is a task for writers and artists to take up. There are also questions for our 
media and democratic infrastructures, of how they can be designed in such a way as to let 
anger be heard and recognised, rather than just seen as spectacle or detected as behaviour. 
This is a challenge of pace-setting, that is, allowing for an anger that is neither too fast nor 
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